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Abstract
In this paper we examine the costs of seemingly excessive pay awards to
CEO’s within the UK FTSE 100 in the last decade and the consequent
growth in executive pay inequality. Are CEOs taking a large proportion
of the total pot (a big “pay slice”) less able to return value to shareholders
by better management? In presenting this evidence we describe variations
in the whole distribution of executive pay, rather than invoking some arbi-
trary cut-off point, to determine how changes in shareholder value match
to concurrent changes in the distribution of executive pay. We ask whether
the impact of executive pay-inequality is a function of board size, rendering
the CEO pay slice measure problematic in this context? If so, how does the
interaction of board size and corporate performance, as measured by share-
holder returns, explain variations in the sensitivity of the pay-performance
relationship for UK FTSE 100 executives? We advance the Gini coefficient
as a preferable measure of executive pay inequality in order to capture the
impact of perceived inequality upon corporate performance.
Introduction
The very high pay of some executives has provoked public anger and official
censure (see Hargreaves (2011)). Hargreaves (p 69) concludes
“wage inequality is part of a toxic form of free market capital-
ism a winner takes all system that allows monopolies to accrue
and discourages the entrepreneurialism it is meant to facilitate.”
In this paper we examine the costs of seemingly excessive pay awards to
CEO’s within the UK FTSE 100 in the last decade. We focus on the propor-
tion of total board pay taken by the CEO as a proportion of the remuneration
pool available to all the executives on the board and not just the top 5 or
some other arbitrary cut-off point.
Evidence that firm performance deteriorates as the share of total remu-
neration, given to the 5 best paid executives, rises already exists for the US.
This metric is referred to as the “CEO pay slice” or CPS in much of the
literature and we denote it as CPS ourselves henceforth. Bebchuk, Mar-
tijn, and Peyers (2011) present evidence on the relationship between CPS
and corporate performance for a sample of large US companies. Bebchuk et
al report that corporate value, as proxied by a number of performance mea-
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sures including Tobin’s Q, post-earnings announcement share price responses,
shareholder responses to acquisitions and executive turnover, all deteriorate
as CPS rises. This suggests that a high CPS may reflect something other
than a reasonable reward for services rendered to company shareholders. Too
high a CPS may induce feelings of unfairness, or exploitation, amongst the
junior ranks of the senior management team. Jordan (2011) has replicated
many of these results using Australian data for the years 2008-2010 obtaining
a similar pattern of results.
This paper focuses on a potential weakness in the CPS as an inequality
metric when applied to companies with boards containing both less than and
more than five members, which accounts for about half the companies in our
UK FTSE 100 sample. For such companies, with more than 5 board mem-
bers, those executives from the sixth best paid and below do not have their
pay included in the CPS measure of pay inequality. If the pay-performance
relationship is constant across board size partitions of the sample then this
is merely a technical quibble of little interest. But if pay-performance rela-
tionships vary systematically with board size then a more careful analysis
becomes essential. In this paper we show that pay-performance relationships
do vary systematically with board size and are especially sharp in larger
2
board company cohorts where we might expect the CPS measure to be a
poor proxy of pay inequality.
This paper provides additional evidence on the Bebchuk et al (2011) hy-
pothesis that a higher CPS damages company performance for a sample of
companies drawn from outside the US. We further ask whether the CPS
measure, increasingly now invoked as the standard metric of executive pay
inequality, is a helpful way to understand the relationship between executive
pay inequality and corporate performance.
While much of the debate concerning managerial “power” to set their
own pay has been US based. Conyon, Core, and Guay (2011) have shown
that, controlling for risk, UK and US CEO pay levels are not as different
as had previously been assumed. Hence comparable evidence from the UK
concerning the impact of the distribution of executive pay within the board
of directors on corporate performance is of interest in furthering the debate.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section,
Section 1, we review relevant literature and express the focus of our interest
more fully. In Section 2 we give details of our research method in examining
these issues and a description of the data we employ to investigate them
and our data is presented in Section 3. Section 3 and 4 present our results
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and interprets them. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and draws some
policy conclusions.
1 Previous research.
Bebchuck et al (2011) raised concerns about how excessive rewards to CEO’s
in relation to their senior executive peers may adversely affect corporate
performance and especially shareholder returns. Explanations of executive
pay broadly conform to one of two alternative theoretical frames
1. optimal contracting, or the provision of incentives for shareholders to
deliver for shareholders,
2. executive power, reflecting the ability of executives to insulate them-
selves from market pressures and pay themselves too much.
The optimal contracting perspective simply sees high rewards to CEOs
as a reward to risks taken by very talented individuals. While CEO pay
may be high it simply reflects the outcome of contracts freely entered into
by shareholders seeking to attract the best managerial talent ( (Jensen and
Meckling 1976), Hart (1995)). The purpose of large pay awards, especially
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stock option grants, in this model is to unify the interest of owners and man-
agers in a corporation characterised by a division of ownership and control.
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) strongly supported the second view in their
landmark book. The specific argument that a high CPS damages sharehold-
ers can be seen as an exercise of unaccountable power by CEO’s and hence
must be seen as part of the presence of a broader assertion of CEO ”power” at
shareholders’ expense. Bebchuk et al (2011) present evidence of the relation-
ship between company performance, as proxied by Tobin’s Q, and a number
of dimensions of corporate performance. They present evidence on over 3,000
CEO’s heading up over 2,000 companies in the years 1993-2004 and report
on the relationship between corporate performance and CPS. They find high
CPS companies.
• report lower profits,
• are more likely to ”backdate” options,
• are more likely to undertake shareholder value destroying acquisitions,
• are more likely to retain a poorly performing CEO.
Hence for Bebchuk et al a high CPS is bad. It is bad because higher levels
of CPS depress company’s performance on a variety of credible performance
5
measures2
Part of the reason why it is difficult to detect the economic impact of a
CEO’s ability on corporate value is that the best companies tend to attract
the most able CEO’s to start with, while the worst companies must scavenge
for whatever is left. Hence it is not clear which way the causality runs. Do
great CEO’s create great companies or do great companies simply have the
good fortune to be able to recruit the most able CEOs? Chang, Dasgupta,
and Hilary (2010) try to resolve this causality issue by relating relative CEO
pay (the CPS) to the performance of US CEOs leaving their companies over
the years 1992-2002. They report higher CPS/CEO pay inequality is associ-
ated with
1. negative abnormal returns at the announcement of the CEO’s depar-
ture, suggesting they were worth the pay they received,
2. better re-employment prospects upon departure, suggesting relatively
high paid CEOs have both higher job-specific and general human cap-
ital endowments,
2This finding accords with a huge amount of evidence reported by behavioural
economists that most of us value ”fairness” and react badly to any perceived unfairness,
or slight, others perpetrate against us (see Fehr and Gachter (2004))
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3. CEOs joining companies where performance also improves subsequent
to their arrival, suggesting they can add value both with their current
company and elsewhere.
These findings suggest that the high pay of CEOs may indeed reflect their
ability to create value for shareholders. Below we seek to shed light on the
degree to which this result holds true for UK FTSE 100 CEOs in the last
decade.
1.1 Corporate performance and board size.
Much of the debate concerning the distribution of executive pay has invoked
the CPS/top slice measure. This asks how much the CEO earns as a propor-
tion of the best five paid executives on the board. Once board membership
exceeds five members this metric remains constant, as the sixth member of
the board and beyond do not see their pay enter into the calculation. This
is fine so long as board size and corporate performance are unrelated. But
if not, and we aim to show this is the more credible scenario, then the CPS
measure is placed in doubt. If both corporate performance and pay inequality
vary with board size a potential for omitted variable bias arises.
The direction of any omitted variable bias thus induced is, a priori, un-
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clear. But omitted variable bias also enlarges standard errors in regression
based tests and this second form of bias can either compound that arising
in the mean effect, or offset it depending on the direction of bias in the
estimated mean. The much reported finding (for example see (Eisenberg,
Sundgren, and Wells 1998)) that smaller boards make better decisions seems
to accord with a belief that larger groups find it hard to reach consensus,
or at least to do so quickly, suggests such an omitted variable bias may be
present.
That corporate performance is affected by board size is already well chron-
icled in the literature. Yermack (1996) found a clear decline in returns to
shareholders3 as board size increased for a sample of large US companies in
the period 1984-1991. This finding appeared robust to the inclusion of stan-
dard controls for a sample company’s industry and size. Later Eisenberg,
Sundgren, and Wells (1998) were able to confirm that more profitable com-
panies had smaller boards on average using a sample of 900 Finnish compa-
nies, including some far smaller companies than those included in Yermack’s
earlier study.
For the UK Guest (2009) reports results that largely confirm the dele-
3As captured by Tobin’s Q
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terious effects of larger boards on company performance using three per-
formance metrics, including shareholder returns. Guest find this result is
robust to standard econometric controls for endogeneity, such as using gen-
eral method of moments estimation which conditions upon the company’s
prior performance. This confirmed earlier evidence on a variety of European
states reported a decade before by Conyon and Foreman-Peck (1998).
2 Research Method
Initially we focus on whether changes in the proportion of salary going to
the CEO has affected corporate performance, as measured by shareholder
returns, and how this varies with board size. We then ask whether the
relationship between board size and corporate performance/pay-inequality
relationship conditions pay/performance elasticities. For it is these very
pay/performance elasticities that have been central to debate concerning the
fairness of executive compensation.
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2.1 Measures of salary inequality amongst senior ex-
ecutives
We measure the shifting distribution of CEO pay and its greater inequality
over time by movements in the Gini coefficient for each of these variables.
The Gini coefficient is a simple measure of inequality already much used in
studies of income inequality (see Sen and Foster (1997) and Cowell (1995)).
The Gini coefficient measures the incremental percentage of income ac-
counted for by the richest person in the group as a proportion of all income,
as compared to that associated with an equal distribution of income. A
Gini coefficient of one denotes the richest person getting all the income, that
is, complete inequality. A Gini coefficient of zero denotes completely equal
shares in income for everyone in the economy, that is, complete equality.
Each Gini coefficient value reported below should therefore be interpreted as
a premium in executive pay over and above what we would expect if all exec-
utives on the board were paid an equal share of the total board of directors
pay pot4.
4The Gini coefficient (G) is then the ratio of the difference between the 45◦ line of
absolute equality and the curve denoting the actual, unequal, distribution to the total
area lying beneath the line of equality.
10
While the Gini coefficient has various mathematical representations it can
be expressed as simply one half of the relative mean difference, defined as
the arithmetic average of the absolute value differences, between all pairs of
incomes. So G can be expressed
G = (1/2n2µ)
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
|yi − yj|
= 1− (1/n2µ)
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Min(yi, yj)
= 1 + (1/n)− (2/n2µ)[y1 + 2y2 + .....+ nyn]
for y1 ≥ y2 ≥ .... ≥ yn. (1)
where, y is the variable whose inequality is to be judged (here executive pay),
µ is the average level of income across members of the group (say a company
board) and n is the size of the population (or board size).
The Gini measure of pay-inequality thus has two primary advantages
• for smaller boards, of less than five members, the Gini metric can still
be calculated,
• for larger boards, of more than five members, all board members, and
not just the five highest paid, have their pay enter into the Gini index
measure of pay inequality (unlike the CPS measure).
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2.2 Measures of corporate performance
So far we have focused on the costs of employing highly paid executives,
and especially CEOs. In this section we consider the potential benefits to
shareholders in terms of improvements in shareholder returns on equity.
In this paper we focus upon just one of Bebchuk et al (2011) value metrics,
returns to shareholder. We also use “abnormal” share price performance of
the corporation employing the CEO as captured by the 3-factor asset pricing
model of Fama and French (1993)
Rit −Rft = αt + βi(Rmt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + it (2)
as a corporate performance benchmark. Where Rit − Rft is the stock mar-
ket premium commanded by the stock, RM − Rft is the standard market
premium offered over the risk free-rate, as in the standard CAPM, SMB is
the premium/discount paid on the smallest 30% of stocks traded by market
capitalisation, as against the biggest 30% by market capitalisation. HML is
the premium/discount paid by stocks ranked in the highest 30% of the book
to market distribution, as compared to those ranked in the lowest 30% of the
book to market distribution.
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3 Data
Our CEO executive pay database is comprised of payments made to execu-
tives employed by UK FTSE 100 constituent members in the period March
1998 to March 2010 provided by Hemscott5 part of the Morningstar group.
The data consists of 6046 individual executive years taken from 127 compa-
nies who featured in the UK FTSE 100 during our sample period.
Data on shareholder returns is taken from the London Share Price database,
which is described in Staunton (2012). A distinct advantage of this database
is its coverage of both live and “dead” companies in the database, thus miti-
gating at least one source of survivorship bias. The database also captures a
true measure of liquidating returns to shareholders, as opposed to the -100%
return implicitly assumed in price based return measures.
The data on factor mimicking portfolios for estimating the Fama and
French (1993) model are taken from the Exeter XFi website6 described in
Gregory, Tharyan, and Huang (2009). While the Fama-French model is now
something of an industry standard in the US, employing factors drawn from
Ken French’s website, the use of comparable adjustments in the UK are only
5http://www2.hemscott.com/
6http://xfi.exeter.ac.uk/researchandpublications/portfoliosandfactors/files.php
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now emerging.
Table 1 gives some basic data descriptives for trends in the data. Ex-
ecutive pay is rising in our sample years when we consider all executive
positions, but executive remuneration is also increasingly widely dispersed
as the decade goes on. As we shall show this is partially because of the grow-
ing premia paid to UK FTSE 100 CEOs in the last decade. The variability
in executives pay within this UK FTSE 100 sample is immediately obvious.
These amounts may seem paltry compared to US counterparts, Conyon et
al (2011), for example, report that for a sample of UK and US executives
median pay of the UK sample was $1.9 million, or 30% less than their US
peer group.
4 Results.
4.1 Alternative measures of board pay inequality.
Table 2 gives a comparison of our Gini and CPS inequality metrics when
they are constructed for just the highest paid executive, when that person is
also the CEO of the company. Figure 1 shows how the two measures cross-
section distribution relate to each other. Recall the CPS is a measure of the
14
proportional share taken by the CEO, as a proportion of the total paid to
five best paid directors, whereas the Gini coefficient captures a premium paid
to the CEO over and above that expected if all executives on the board were
to be paid an equal share. When making this comparison we only consider
companies where the highest paid director is the CEO. We lose 4 companies
from the sample, for at least some sample years, because of this restriction.
Henceforth we refer to the highest paid director as the CEO in our analysis.
The CPS metric tells us that the CEO takes about 30% of the pay-pot
available on average to the five best paid directors. But the Gini coefficient
reveals that when all members are considered, and not just the five best
paid, the CEO takes around 10% more of the total board pay pot than he
would if the distribution of pay amongst all executives were equal. However
the difference in means between the CPS and Gini measures of inequality
is most obvious in Table 2 and Figure 1. Yet the dispersion of these two
measures of pay inequality is of far greater analytical interest here because
we use it to explain resulting differences in corporate performance.
This comparative stability of company based CPS calculations in Table
2 derives mechanically from the fact that whilst CPS relates only to the five
best paid executives, while the Gini coefficient measures the share of the
15
CEO relative to the total board pay bill. Since our comparison in Table 2 is
only for board’s containing 5 or more members the Gini coefficient we report
is bounded below the CPS metric of earlier research. But the difference in
levels between CPS and Gini metrics is small compared to the huge difference
in variation between the two inequality metrics. The Gini coefficient is six
times more volatile than the CPS metric if variation is measured by the
coefficient of variation, cv.
The use of the Gini coefficient enables us to measure inequality at a level
beyond that captured by focussing upon on the CEO’s remuneration alone.
Thus we extend our measure of executive pay inequality to capture that
associated with the 3, 5, and ten best paid executives. Table 3 shows the
distributional properties of these broader metrics. Confining discussion to
the first ten ranked positions, where the vast majority of our data clusters,
the CEO stands all too clearly as primus inter pares with the emphasis very
much on his/her primacy. The Gini coefficient falls substantially once we
measure it for the 3 best paid directors. So discussion of executive pay
inequality as a major policy issue most probably only makes sense in the UK
if consideration is entirely focused on the CEO highest paid executive rather
than the senior management team as a whole.
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4.2 Inequality and board size.
To get a sense of how inequality varies with board size we plot our two
inequality measures by board size group in Figure 3. We break measured
inequality into four board size bins, group 1 consists of companies with 5
or less directors, group 2 consists of boards with 6 to 10 directors, group 3
consists of companies with 11 to 20 directors and, finally, group 4 consists
of companies with 21 or more directors on the board. Such divisions must
be regarded as to a large extent arbitrary, although a target board mem-
bership of eight to ten board members commonly appears in the research
literature. While the CPS is unaffected by the pay of executives below the
fifth best paid, the Gini metric is somewhat peaked at group 4, which repre-
sents companies with over 21 directors on the board. The CPS measure can
only be constructed for boards with 5 members7 so the mean value of CPS
in group 2 reflects the overweighting of the markedly lower inequality in such
5 director member companies in the overall aggregate figure. For companies
with boards larger than 5 members the salary of remaining members does
not enter the calculation of CPS. The great strength of the gini coefficient is
it is unaffected by board size as it it measures pay inequality over all board
7So the CPS metric calculation for group 1 is solely compared of 5 member boards.
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members regardless of board size.
So only the Gini coefficient can capture variation in inequality for com-
panies with board sizes greater than 5. Since such companies make up 43%
of our sample company-years this seems a large sacrifice to make to adopt
the CPS measure and a striking reason to prefer our Gini inequality index
measure because it offers a far more comprehensive measure of executive pay
inequality.
Only if the pay-performance relationship is constant across companies
with board sizes smaller than and larger than five members is such an omis-
sion of any control board size advisable. Otherwise the CPS measure of pay
inequality becomes of dubious value. If the pay-performance relationship
varies with board size then the Gini metric can offer added value in the anal-
ysis of the effect of executive pay inequality upon corporate performance.
For example, could it be the that changes in board sizes over time explains
changes in executive pay inequality in ways that the CPS metric is ill-suited
to capture?
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4.3 Inequality, board size and corporate performance.
While it may be true that the CPS measure induces an omitted variable bias
into the relationship between corporate performance and measured inequality
in executive pay, this difference may not be material and hence little more
than a tedious methodological quibble. To show that this is not the case we
now proceed to present evidence concerning how the effect of executive pay
inequalities8 on corporate performance varies with board size.
Figure 3 shows the greater annual variation in the Gini coefficient in
comparison to the CPS measure of inequality. While for the majority of
company/years in our sample the Gini and CPS measures of inequality over-
lap, in a minority of company years with a fairly ordinary CPS value of 0.2 to
0.4 (suggesting the CEO takes between 20% and 40% of the total wage bill)
the Gini coefficient inequality metric spikes much more (rising from a pre-
mium of 6% to 10% for example). The explanation for this cannot be greater
inequality in pay amongst smaller boards, since these companies (with less
than 5 directors) are not included in the Figure 3 comparison anyway. So the
explanation must be greater inequality in larger boards containing executives
paid a a small amount compared to the CEO.
8As measured by both CPS and the Gini coefficient.
19
Could it be that these larger boards, with comparatively poorly paid
”place men” account for the poor performance of board’s with very unequal
executive pay? If so, the examination of the effect of CEO pay on corporate
performance may be conflating two issues; the well documented impact of
board size on corporate performance/shareholder returns, and the impact of
pay inequality itself upon the same variable. We try to disentangle the effect
of these two interacting variables in our reported results below.
Table 4 and Figure 3 show the impact of board size on the sensitivity
of corporate value to executive pay inequality, as measured by CPS and the
Gini coefficient. Table 4 shows both the overall Spearman rank correlation
coefficient between changes in raw shareholder returns and pay inequality
prevailing in our four board size groups (1=less than 5, 2=6 to 10, 3=11 to
20, 4=20 or more).
Figure 4 gives a graphical representation of the shareholder return sensi-
tivity to pay inequality implied by Table 4. Overall a fairly weak correlation
is found between shareholders’ returns and executive pay inequality, this is
small and negative for both CPS (-0.042) and the Gini coefficient (-0.032)
inequality metrics9.
9Sample sizes for our 4 board of director size grouping are given in Tables 5 and 6
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But it is at the extremes of the board size distribution distribution that
very different inferences arise using the Gini and CPS metrics of pay inequal-
ity. Amongst the cohort of companies with the smallest boards, five members
or less, pay inequality appears damaging whichever executive pay inequality
metric is used. This makes intuitive sense because it is in such small boards
that personal ties are likely to ensure than pay differences are most keenly
felt. Nevertheless the large negative correlation between pay inequality and
returns to shareholders for the cohort of companies with five directors (CPS
cannot be calculated for smaller boards) reminds us of the reduction in the
CPS sensitivity to underlying inequality amongst all board members (and
not just the five highest paid) for larger boards.
In the group of companies with a board size of between six and ten greater
executive pay inequality appears to serve to raise corporate performance, or
at least raise returns to shareholders if the Gini metric of executive pay
inequality is used. This finding is in direct contradiction to the findings of
prior research ( for example Bebchuk, et al) which argues for a uniformly
negative impact of executive pay inequality. The CPS measure here shows a
uniformly negative effect of executive pay inequality on shareholder returns in
below.
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accordance with the reported findings of previous studies using that measure.
For boards of ten members this measure of executive pay inequality ig-
nores the salary of half the board in measuring the degree of inequality. As
Figure 4 shows both large (more than twenty members) and small boards
(five or less board members) are associated with inequality reducing perfor-
mance when the Gini inequality metric is used. The effect of executive pay
inequality on shareholders’ returns follows a inverted U-shape, reducing re-
turns amongst corporations with small or large boards and raising returns (if
a Gini inequality measure is used) elsewhere. Together with the previously
reported U shaped relation between executive pay and corporate performance
this suggests medium sized boards, with a clearly dominant leader, are best
placed to yield shareholders superior returns
The diminution of corporate value by executive pay inequality is less
marked when a CPS measure is used but is also most marked for large boards
of more than twenty members (Group 4 in our board size banding). It is of
course for such boards that three-quarters or more of the executives on the
board do not see their salary enter into the calculation of the CPS metric of
pay inequality. Hence it might appear that the CPS is making the strongest
inferences about how pay inequality impacts upon corporate performance
22
where its usage seems most inappropriate.
4.4 The impact of board size on pay versus perfor-
mance sensitivities.
The focus of our paper is decisively the impact of pay inequality on corporate
performance rather than the standard pay-performance sensitivity as such.
Yet if our critique of the usage of CPS is to prove fruitful we would expect
the sensitivity of the pay/performance relationship itself to be conditioned on
board size. To investigate this implication of the previous results we return
to the classic pay-performance sensitivity estimated by Jensen and Murphy
(1990) for the US and more recently by Conyon et al (2011) for the UK and
the US.
In Table 5 we consider changes in pay for only the ten best paid executives
each company-year in our sample, unless there are less than ten members
of the board recorded. We impose this restriction to prevent insignificant
comparisons, with minor players on the board, blurring our results. We
include only executives who stay with the same company in the consecutive
years for which we calculate those executives’ pay change. We calculate
returns on an April to April basis to allow for publication of company results
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and hence market assessment of the executive team’s performance. Initially
we examine pay-performance relationships using raw annualised cumulative
returns.
The results of standard pay-performance regressions of the form of equa-
tion (1) in Jensen and Murphy (1990), are reported in Table 5, Figure 4 gives
Spearman rank correlation tests for the same dependency. Previous findings
that increases in the pay awarded to executives and the returns shareholders
receive for the executives’ efforts bear almost no relationship is confirmed
for the overall sample. But the interest in Table 5, once again, lies in what
happens once the estimation of pay-performance sensitivities are decomposed
into the board size bandings previously considered.
The lower panels in Table 5 shows the sensitivity of changes in returns
to changes in executive pay for the ten best paid executives. For the largest
boards, with 21 or more members, pay-performance relationships are, posi-
tive, quite tight and clearly statistically significant. Elsewhere the estimated
coefficient is either significant but smaller (board group 1, companies with 5
or less executives on the board) or insignificant and perversely signed (board
groups 2 and 3, companies with six to twenty members of the board). This
U-shaped relationship between pay and performance, positive and signifi-
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cant for small and large boards, negative and insignificant for medium sized
boards confirms our hypothesis that board size is important as a conditioning
variable, as argued earlier. This is confirmed by a joint F-test of the restric-
tion to exclude the board size dummies from the estimated pay-performance
regression.
This U-shaped relation mimics the results of our earlier tests of the im-
pact of executive pay inequality (however we measure it) on shareholders’
returns, where an inverted U-shape characterised the inequality/performance
relationship. Pay changes may serve to raise performance, especially amongst
a cohort of companies governed by larger boards. But it is exactly the ap-
peal of this incentive effect that serves to induce a destructive level of pay
inequality amongst serving executives which may erode the likelihood of bet-
ter performance.This suggests discussion of the incentive effects of executive
pay inequality should bear in mind the mediating impact of board size. It
appears large pay inequalities can erode the incentive effect of further pay
rises in companies that do not have medium sized boards. These offsetting
effects must be traded-off by remuneration committees given their potentially
contradictory impact upon shareholders’ returns.
Taken together Figures 3 and 4 suggest pay rises have their greatest moti-
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vating effect, in inducing better performance, amongst companies with larger
boards. The results presented in Table 4 suggest for such large companies
executive pay inequality can be damaging to shareholder returns.
Hence one interpretation of our combined results is that pay rises for
companies with larger boards improve corporate performance. However this
is only if these pay increases are not given in a way that exacerbates existing
pay inequality amongst board members.
Regression based tests of hypotheses are notoriously plagued by speci-
fication problems of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and peculiarities of
functional form. So as a robustness check in Table 6 and Figure 4 we revisit
pay-performance sensitivities, for the ten best paid executives, through the
lens of Spearman rank correlations. A Spearman rank correlation is a non-
parametric measure of correspondence less likely to have its results distorted
by outlier observations and non-linearities in the observed pay/performance
relationships.
Once again, as for the regression based tests, our U-shaped pay per-
formance relationship indicates executive pay increases are associated with
higher shareholders’ returns for the smallest and largest board size bands,
while the relationships in the other board size groups are not. Indeed for
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smaller boards, those with five members or less, the Spearman rank corre-
lation, while marginally positive, is tiny and (just) insignificant at the 95%
confidence interval. It is positive and significant for large boards, where in-
creases in CEO pay appear to have substantial motivating effects. Hence it is
for these very companies that the CPS measure, so central to prior published
research, is likely to represent executive pay inequality very poorly indeed.
4.5 Robustness checks
In this section we control for two of the most obvious sensitivities of our
results to the particular research methods followed in constructing them. The
first concerns the sample chosen and the second the particular way in which
we measure corporate performance. Firstly we control for risk in measuring
variations in shareholder returns. Secondly we show how the division of the
sample between executive and non-executive directors (NEDs) influences our
results.
4.5.1 Controlling for risk.
Our reported results, using the Gini pay inequality metric, suggest compa-
nies with a medium sized board have their performance significantly improved
27
by greater pay inequality amongst members of the board. This is in clear
contradiction of previously published research on the topic which claims a
uniformly negative effect of pay inequality upon corporate performance. To
check whether these differences are offset by companies with medium-sized
boards simply taking on risker projects in a search to raise their board mem-
bership’s pay (especially the call option component) we repeat two central
prior tests using risk-adjusted returns measures. To capture the impact of
risk on the shareholder returns used in our previous tests we repeat the Spear-
man rank correlation tests previous reported as Figures 3 and 4 above but
now using the Fama-French 3-factor model risk adjusted returns of equation
(2).
Rit −Rft = αt + βi(Rmt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + it
Such abnormal returns are simply the difference between raw shareholder
returns and those that would be predicted by Fama-French 3-factor model of
equation (2) above when normal sensitivities to the three factors considered
are assumed.
These tests are reported as Figure 5 (a risk-adjusted version of Figure 3)
and Figure 6 (a risk-adjusted version of Figure 4) below. Estimates of the
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three factor loading are obtained by running Fama-French 3-factor model
regressions for the five years/60 months prior to the company-year return
considered. These factor sensitivities are then imposed on the data for the
relevant company-year to generate a “abnormal” return value.
Overall we conclude the effect of risk-adjustments on our results is to
simplify and sharpen them. Specifically the underlying sensitivity of pay-
inequality/performance is positive throughout all board size groups, but is
strongest amongst the smallest (with 5 members or less) and largest (with
more than 21 members) boards .
4.6 The status of the director, executive directors ver-
sus NEDs
Executive and non-executive directors have very different roles on the board
and are paid very differently. Hence treating them both as having the same
influence on pay-inequality and hence corporate performance is somewhat
hazardous. For this reason we repeat our analysis excluding NEDs from our
sample. This removes 165 observations of our sample of 6046 executive/year
observations, about 2.7%. The Combined code guidance suggests at least
two NEDs should be appointed to each board (FRC (2012)), but the board
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should not be allowed to become so large as to be unwieldy. This suggests our
sample may considerably understate the presence of NEDs on UK boards.
We present our revised results for Tables 6 and 7. Removal of the small
number of NEDs in our sample does not change our substantial finding of
a U shaped at least over the range of board size groupings 1 to 3, contain-
ing twenty members or less. For very large boards, with more than twenty
members (in group 4) increases in pay inequality reduce shareholder returns
rather than increase them less, as in board group 2 (consisting of compa-
nies of 5 to 10 members). So for this sample of purely executive directors
increases in pay never damage shareholder wealth, except in a small number
of companies with very large boards, but do not increase shareholder returns
either.
5 Conclusions and implications.
This paper revisits the issue of the impact of inequality in executive pay
awards on corporate performance using the UK FTSE 100 sample over the
period 1998-2010. Prior US evidence finds a significantly damaging impact
of executive pay inequality on corporate performance using a wide variety
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of performance indicators. Examining shareholder returns for our UK FTSE
100 sample we are unable to replicate this result insofar as it relates to
executive pay inequality damaging shareholders’ returns. Rather it appears
the effect of executive pay inequality on shareholders’ returns depends on the
size of the corporate board, with reductions in returns for companies with
large and small boards and incremental shareholders’ returns, especially when
they are risk-adjusted, for companies with medium sized boards (of between
six and twenty members given our definition). A number of researchers
have pointed to an optimal board size of around eight to ten ( see Guest
(2009) and Jensen (1993)) our research says little about this matter directly.
Rather we point out the danger of asserting a damaging affect of executive
pay inequality using a metric, like the CPS, which is so clearly sensitive to
variations in board size.
This dependency of the relationship between pay inequality and corporate
performance on corporate board size has some disturbing implications for
how pay inequality is currently measured. Published research on the effects
of executive pay inequality has relied heavily on the CPS metric. This metric
cannot be constructed at all for companies with less than 5 members on the
board of directors. Such companies constitute about 43% of the UK FTSE
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100 sample have board sizes of 5 members or less in our sample data.
For companies with boards containing more than five members the CPS
metric ignores the pay of executives beyond the fifth best paid on the board.
So for larger boards the CPS measure can be a very inadequate measure
of executive pay inequality. Such large board companies are exactly those
that bear the strongest correlation both between shareholders’ returns and
executive pay inequality and individual executives pay rises and shareholder
returns. This serves to remind us of a central tenet of the UK Corporate
Governance Code’s (FRC (2010)) ”comply or explain” principle that prudent
investors
“ should pay due regard to companies individual circumstances
and bear in mind, in particular, the size and complexity of the
company and the nature of the risks and challenges it faces.”
This includes the size of the board itself and how individual executives’ pay
packages are structured in order to make the board in place, whatever its
size, most effective in serving shareholders’ interests. The prominent use of
the CPS metric of pay executive inequality in debate surrounding executive
pay seems strange when there are alternative measures, like the Gini coef-
ficient, which is not subject to such a dependency on board size. To better
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understand the relation between executive pay inequality and corporate per-
formance we suggest the alternative path outlined in this paper is further
explored.
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6 Tables & Figures.
Table 1: Summary statistics for compensation data using full sam-
ple.
Variable N Mean σ. Min Max
salary 6046 398434.9 301351.3 0 9100000
bonus 6046 314234.9 515870.6 0 1.00E+07
benefits 6046 44125.36 105692.1 0 2021218
other 6046 27030.09 242991.4 -46332 1.07E+07
pension 6046 26483.61 100197.4 0 2971055
options 6046 55898.5 341106.2 -1068441 1.12E+07
comp 6046 19838.04 177077.7 0 6076200
exception 6046 678.7959 43100.72 0 3300000
total 6046 886724.2 907539.7 8000 1.39E+07
Note. All figures are in £.
Table 2: Comparison of CPS and Gini coefficient for highest paid
executive.
Variable N Mean σ. Min Max cv
Gini 650 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.83 1.53
Cps 331 0.32 0.08 0.04 0.77 0.25
Note Here σ denotes the standard deviation of the variable and cv
its coefficient of variation (the ratio of the standard deviation to its mean
value).
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Table 3: Gini coefficient for larger executive pay groups 1998-2010
Year N (all ranks) Gini for best paid if CEO Gini 3 best Gini 5 best Gini 10 best
1998 225 0.07 0.093 0.04 0.03
1999 482 0.1 0.089 .045 0.027
2000 505 0.08 0.088 0.046 0.03
2001 500 0.095 0.083 0.049 0.029
2002 520 0.05 0.094 0.051 0.042
2003 520 0.095 0.091 0.061 0.046
2004 1005 0.11 0.164 0.094 0.05
2005 552 0.093 0.089 0.056 0.04
2006 542 0.085 0.09 0.059 0.043
2007 447 0.051 0.077 0.056 0.048
2008 442 0.082 0.081 0.058 0.057
2009 470 0.06 0.087 0.048 0.034
2010 155 0.075 0.083 0.053 0.03
Table 4: Spearman rank correlations between inequality measures
and shareholder returns.
Full sample Group 1: Five or less Directors
CPS Gini Returns CPS Gini Returns
CPS 1 CPS 1
Gini -0.019 1 Gini 0.12 1
Returns -0.042 -0.032 1 Returns -0.508 -0.1146 1
Group 2: Five to ten directors Group 3: Eleven to twenty directors
CPS Gini Returns CPS Gini Returns
CPS 1 CPS 1
Gini -0.443 1
Returns -0.231 0.181 1
Group 4: Twenty-one or more
CPS Gini Returns
CPS 1
Gini -0.258 1
Returns -0.13 -0.066 1
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Table 5: Pay-performance regressions.
All years
Returni,t Coef. SE White t-value P(t) R
2 N
returns 0.012 0.016 0.76 0.444 0.0003 2246
cons 0.185 0.011 16.54 0
board group = 1, Five or less directors on board.
Returni,t Coef. SE White t-value P(t) R
2 N
returns 0.068 0.031 2.18 0.029 0.006 907
cons 0.216 0.018 11.73 0.180
board group = 2, Six to ten directors.
Returni,t Coef. SE White t-value P(t) R
2 N
returns -0.004 0.021 -0.17 0.868 0 1047
cons 0 .167 0.015 11.02 0
board group = 3, Eleven to 20 directors.
Returni,t Coef. SE White t-value P(t) R
2 N
returns -0.040 0.0433 -0.96 0.34 0.005 227
cons 0 .171 0.04 4.23 0
board group = 4, Twenty-one directors or more.
Returni,t Coef. SE White t-value P(t) R
2 N
returns 0.343 0.110 3.12 0.004 0.17 38
cons -0.136 0.083 -1.64 0.11
Returni,t = a+ b∆Payi,t (3)
Note. Calculated using data for the ten best paid corporate executives in each
company-year, or fewer when the board has less than ten members. Reported
t-values are constructed according to White (1980) robust methods. The
various dummies included are defined according to our board size groupings.
So board group=2 equals 1 for company-years where board size is greater
than five but less than ten board group=3 equals 1 for company-years where
board size is greater than ten but less than twenty and, finally, board group=4
equals 1 for company-years where board sizes is greater than twenty.
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Table 6: Spearman rank correlation (ρ) of executive pay changes
relation to shareholder returns delivered for ten best paid execu-
tives.
Spearman ρ Significance level N
All companies 0.013 0.52 2246
boardgroup=1 0.062 0.06 907
boardgroup=2 -0.027 0.37 1074
boardgroup=3 -0.055 0.407 227
boardgroup=4 0.378 0.018 38
Note. The various dummies included are defined according to our board size
groupings. So boardgroup=2 equals 1 for company-years where board size
is greater than five but less than ten board group=3 equals 1 for company-
years where board size is greater than ten but less than twenty and, finally,
board group=4 equals 1 for company-years where board sizes is greater than
twenty.
Table 7: Spearman rank correlation (ρ) of executive pay changes re-
lation to shareholder returns delivered for ten best paid executives.
Excluding all NED’s
Spearman ρ Significance level N
All companies 0.09 0.05 2081
boardgroup=1 0.20 0.001 854
boardgroup=2 0.05 0.05 1010
boardgroup=3 0.24 0.028 201
boardgroup=4 -0.16 0.33 16
Note. The various dummies included are defined according to our board size
groupings. So boardgroup=2 equals 1 for company-years where board size
is greater than five but less than ten board group=3 equals 1 for company-
years where board size is greater than ten but less than twenty and, finally,
board group=4 equals 1 for company-years where board sizes is greater than
twenty.
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Figure 5: Gini vsersus CPS measure of pay inequality
Figure 1: Gini versus CPS measure of pay inequality.
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Figure 2: Gini versus CPS measure of pay inequality.
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Figure 4: Spearman rank correlation between raw shareholders’ returns and
inequality metrics.
Note Where Group 1 consists of companies with five or fewer directors on
the board, Group 2 consists of companies with five to ten directors, Group
3 consists of companies with eleven to twenty directors and, finally Group 4
consists of companies with more than twenty directors on the board.
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Figure 5: Spearman rank correlation between raw shareholders’ returns and
changes in highest paid executive (if the CEO) pay.
Note
Calculated using data for the ten best paid corporate executives in each
company-year, or fewer when the board has less than ten members. Where
Group 1 consists of companies with five or fewer directors on the board,
Group 2 consists of companies with five to ten directors, Group 3 consists
of companies with eleven to twenty directors and, finally Group 4 consists of
companies with more than twenty directors on the board.
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Figure 6: Spearman rank correlations between Fama-?French factor risk-
?adjusted returns and pay inequality measures
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Figure 7: Spearman rank correlation between Fama-French 3-factor risk-
adjusted returns and changes in highest paid executive (if CEO pay).
Note on Figures 5 & 6
Here returns are adjusted according to the Fama-French 3 factor model
benchmark adjusted returns where regressions to estimate the factor loadings
on of the form
Rit −Rft = αt + βi(Rmt −Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + it
which are estimated on five years of monthly data, or 60 months, in the
period just before the year for which the rank correlation is measured.
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